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Abstract 
This paper deals with an issue of increasing importance in a world where preferential 
trading arrangements are the call of the day: the effects on world welfare of sequential cus-
toms union formation. A computational model of customs union formation is developed and 
simulated under a variety of assumptions. These assumptions concern various characteristics 
of the world, the pattern of customs union formation, and GATT restrictions on the common 
external tariff imposed by the customs union. The results show that unrestricted customs 
union formation is likely to result in successive deterioration of world welfare, despite gains 
for the member countries collectively. An examination of the current GATT guidelines, how-
ever, reveals that if they were more vigorously enforced, the deleterious effects of customs 
union formation could be eliminated. 
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1. Introduction 
The existence of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been 
largely responsible for the historical reductions in the incidence of tariffs worldwide. The 
current Uruguay Round of negotiations is, however, calling into question the ability of the 
GATT to continue as the primary forum for trade negotiations. There are in fact those 
in the economics profession who suggest that the GATT as an institution is either dead, 
should be shot, or both. Concurrent with the declining success of the multilateral negotia-
tions is an increased willingness of countries to enter into preferential trading arrangements 
(PTAs ). Examples of such arrangements are the European Economic Community (EEC), 
the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). While it is not clear that the GATT is being appropriately eulogized, it 
is increasingly clear that a greater understanding of the effects on world welfare of PTAs is 
needed. Accordingly, this paper proceeds to analyze the welfare effects of a particular type 
of PTA: the fo~mation of a customs union. 
Of particular interest is the path of global welfare in a world in which trade liberal-
ization is accomplished solely through customs union formation. While conventional wisdom 
has it that sequential rounds of multilateral negotiations will inch us ever closer to the op-
timal pattern of world trade, the same cannot be said, with any confidence, of sequential 
customs union formation. Inherent in the formation of any given customs union are com-
peting forces on welfare; there is a welfare-improving tendency for trade between member 
countries to increase and a welfare-reducing tendency to discourage trade between the mem-
her countries and the rest of the world. While it is unlikely that completely general results 
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regarding the path of world welfare will ever exist, it is important that we develop some 
intuition into the likely path of world welfare. It is this intuition that will guide policy and 
attitudes regarding the restriction or regulation of preferential trading arrangements. Such 
restrictions might come from within the confines of the GATT which has as its primary goal 
the promotion of the optimal pattern of world trade. The extent, then, to which unfettered 
customs union formation is consistent with this goal should be reflected in GATT policy. 
The existing theoretical literature on customs union formation, of which there is a 
great deal, has devoted substantial effort towards decomposing and quantifying the impact 
on welfare of a given customs union. The work largely begins with the pioneering effort of 
Jacob Viner (1950), which introduced the distinction between the trade creating and trade 
diverting effects of a given customs union mentioned above. A recent review and extension 
of the literature is to be found in de Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1992). 
What is noteworthy, however, is that the literature referred to above deals only with 
the formation of a single customs union. What we actually observe is a dynamic process 
of more and larger unions being formed. Therefore, the question that appears especially 
relevant is: Will successive customs union formation lead to increased world welfare? Ul-
timately, the answer must be yes, if the process leads to its logical culmination in a world 
consisting of one customs union - a situation of global free trade. Whether or not world 
welfare increas~ in the intermediate stages is unclear, but important given the likely event 
that the process will stop short of free trade. 
Krugman (1991) and Deardorff and Stern (1991) represent two recent attempts to 
identify the effects of dynamic customs union formation. Each provides insight into the 
path of world welfare under a regime of bilateral trade negotiations by employing very 
different methodologies. Deardorff and Stern, using a model in which trade conforms to the 
patterns dictated by comparative advantage, theoretically derive the path of world welfare 
as the world, through symmetric customs union formation, moves from autarky to free trade. 
Tariffs are set at a level that prohibits inter-bloc trade while intra-bloc trade is undistorted. 
3 . ..._ 
Individual countries differ in terms of technology and endowments. They proceed to derive 
the expected level of world welfare at each stage. The resulting path of world welfare is 
a concave function that increases monotonically as the world moves from autarky to free 
trade. The basic conclusion is that the majority of the gains from trade could be captured 
by a, small group of large trading blocs. "The blocs would only need to be large enough 
and to include countries with a sufficiently divergent variety of comparative advantages." 
(Deardorff and Stem, 1991, p. 26) As we will see, the inclusion of non-prohibitive tariffs, 
and hence the possibility of trade diversion, in the analysis alters this result. 
Alternatively, Krugman uses a highly stylized model of differentiated products in 
which each country produces a single good that is distinguishable from all other goods. 1 
Each stage of customs union formation assumes that every country enters into a trading 
agreement with exactly one country, or pre-existing bloc of countries, at each stage, resulting 
in symmetrically sized trading blocs; which is similar to the format used by Deardorff and 
Stem. He finds, in simulations, that world welfare declines with customs union formation 
until the number of blocs reaches three. Beyond this point CU formation is found to be 
welfare improving. 2 
Krugman assumes optimal tariff formation, but as Deardorff and Stern point out, 
his extreme form of product differentiation imposes something very like the Armington as-
sumption; i.e.,: that goods are differentiated completely on the basis of country of origin. 
The Armington assumption in this context exaggerates the role of trade diversion (the neg-
ative aspect of CU formation) relative to trade creation (the positive aspect). Since trade 
diversion is most often thought to be welfare reducing, this assumption will produce results 
for the path of world welfare that are excessively pessimistic. 
The present paper sheds new light on the issue of successive customs unions forma-
tion. In particular, a computational model of dynamic customs union formation is developed 
1 Conceptually, Krugman's model is identical to one in which each country is endowed with a unique commodity 
and trading patterns conform to comparative advantage. 
2 Tests perlormed with the model presented here reveal that it is the product differentiation assumption that is 
directly responsible for the minimal level of welfare at 3 blocs rather than 2. 
and used to generate the expected path of world welfare. The model presented here is con-
ceptually similar to that of Deardorff and Stern, with the exception that non-prohibitive 
tariffs are assumed. As will become clear, this difference permits the discussion of a much 
broader array of issues. 
In brief, the model is based on a world of pure exchange with trading patterns 
determined by comparative advantage; goods flow from countries in which they are relatively 
abundant into countries in which they are relatively scarce. In the benchmark case, countries 
are assumed to set tariffs optimally at all stages. That is, each bloc sets tariff rates to 
maximize welfare taking the tariffs of the other blocs as given. 3 The path of world welfare 
is calculated as countries sequentially enter into customs union agreements; asymmetrically 
sized customs unions are possible. 
More precisely, in each period of a sequential game, two countries, or blocs of coun-
tries, are selected randomly to eliminate the barriers to trade between them and to impose 
common external barriers on goods originating in other countries. 4 This process continues 
until there is a single customs union counting all of the countries in the world as members. 
The focus of the analysis will be on the expected change in world welfare corresponding to 
changes in the number of trading blocs. It should be noted that the structure imposed on 
the model results in an increase in welfare for the customs union collectively, but that one 
or more members may experience a decline in welfare. That is, with intra-union transfers, I 
all member countries can be made better off by entering into the customs union. 
As will be seen, customs union formation is likely to have deleterious effects on world 
welfare prior to reaching global free trade. The robustness of this result is tested in two ways; 
first, by altering the distribution of goods across countries, i.e., making the distribution more 
3 This approach is not a realistic representation of the politics of trade policy. As a single, clearly defined model of the political economy of tariff formation does not exist, this form of external tariff formulation provides a useful starting point. The structure of the model also limits the types of regimes that can be examined. For example, the pure exchange nature eliminates the potential for a pro-producer or pro-<:onsumer bias in determining trade policy. 
4 As there is no single explanation, economic or political, for which countries will likely enter into a p~erential trading arrangements, the assumption of random selection will serve as a useful benchmark. Simulations based on particular selection rules will also be presented; e.g., rules based on the relative endowment structure of the countries. 
or less equal; and second, by selectively choosing countries to form trading blocs, either the 
two countries with the most similar pattern of endowments, or the countries with the most 
different pattern of endowments. The results of these tests reveal that the magnitude of the 
welfare effect is altered by altering the distribution of goods, but that the direction is not. A 
more concentrated distribution of goods results in a more extreme decline in world welfare 
with customs union formation. The results again hold when it is the most similar countries 
forming a customs union, but when the most different countries are selected we find that 
world welfare increases at every stage. 
Subsequent attention is given to different forms of GATT involvement, or influence on 
external tariffs, that might affect the path of world welfare with customs union formation. 
As noted above, the benchmark simulations assume optimal tariffs. To emulate GATT 
involvement, simulations are performed that assume countries entering into a customs union 
are somewhat less aggressive. Three simulatiou; are performed assuming that countries set 
the tariff on each good not higher than the maximum, a trade weighted average, or the 
minimum of the pre-existing tariffs, respectively. The general result is that in each of these 
cases world welfare is an increasing function of customs union formation. 
Each of the scenarios outlined above provide additional evidence and insight into the 
likely path of world welfare in a world where preferential trading arrangements are a common 
form of trade liberalization. It is in this way that this paper builds on and extends the meager 
literature concerning the dynamic "time-path" of world welfare~ The paper proceeds as 
follows. Section 2 presents a model of customs union formation in a comparative advantage 
framework, including a discussion of the assumptions and characteristics of the model that 
particularly influence the results. Section 3 provides simulation results intended to facilitate 
a discussion of the role played by various characteristics of the world in determining the 
path of world welfare under a system of PTAs. These characteristics include the degree of 
specialization of each country; the extent to which it is similar or different countries that 
enter into trading arrangements; and ways in which the GATT might influence the resulting 
common external tariff levels so as to minimize welfare losses. Section 4 concludes and 
provides a discussion of possible extensions. 
2. The Theoretical Model 
The model employed is one of n countries and m commodities. Each country enters 
the system as a representative consumer, assumed to maximize a utility function of the 
following Cobb-Douglas form: 
m 
Ui =All Cij, (1) 
j=l 
where i indexes country and j indexes goods, subject to the budget constraint 
m m m 
L Pj(l + rj)Cij = L Pj(l + rj)fij + L P;rjMij, 
j=l j=l j=l 
where: Cij is the consumption of good j in country i; fij is country i's endowment of good j; 
Mij is the net imports of good j by country i, ( Ci;- fij ); Pj is the world price of good j; and 
rj is the tariff imposed on good j in country i. The left hand side of the budget constraint is 
the value of consumption and the right hand side is the value of the endowments including 
tariff revenue, i.e., national income. It is assumed that each country retains and redistributes 
the tariff revenue collected at its borders. 
It is as~umed that there are equal amounts of each good in world supply. Each good 
is distributed across the n countries via random draws from a normal distribution with a 
common pre-specified variance.5 Each country is, therefore, endowed with some of each good. 
The endowments are normalized within each country so that the sum of endowments is the 
same in each country. 6 Given the distribution of goods across countries, this ensures that the 
countries are approximately the same size, both in terms of quantities and values, calculated 
at the free trade prices. These assumptions are made to facilitate a greater understanding 
5 The distribution is given a mean such that the lowest random draw is positive. This rules out negative endow-
ments. While the normal distribution has infinite tails, a sample of random draws from a normal distribution 
will, in general, have finite tails. 
6 Units are chosen such that the free trade prices are the same for each good. Equalizing quantities is therefore 
equivalent to equalizing the wealth of each country. 
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of the results by abstracting from changes in welfare due to transfers from large to small 
countries and from the effects of relatively scarce goods. 7 
Utility maximization leads to an expenditure system that allocates a fixed portion 
of income to the consumption of each good. The derived demand for each good is 
E '!"=1 P; · €ii 




8ij = f ( 1 + T~) · 
k=l 1 + Tk 
Note that the demand for each good is a function of the landed price of that good, P;(1 +r/). 
World prices are determined by the requirement that global demand for each good be equal 
to its fixed supply, i.e., 
n n 
L Cij = L €ij, j = 1, ... ,m. (4) 
i=l i=l 
Given the assumption that preferences in each country are identical, an appropriate index 
of world welfare is obtained as the sum of each country's utility, 
The results that follow focus on changes in WU corresponding to changes in the global 
trading envirm;unent. 
Nash Tariff Equilibrium 
At each stage, it is assumed that each country or bloc of countries is pursuing a 
policy of optimal tariffs, i.e., that the system is at the Nash tariff equilibrium. The Nash 
tariff equilibrium is characterized by a matrix of tariffs such that each country, or bloc of 
countries, is maximizing its welfare given the tariffs of the other countries. An algorithm for 
obtaining the Nash equilibrium tariffs follows. 
7 These are important issues that are beyond the scope of this paper; future work will address these issues. 
Equation (3) defines consumption to be a function of prices and own tariffs, Gij = 
C(P, ~i); where Pis the vector of world prices and Ti is the vector of tariffs levied by country 
i. Equation ( 4) then defines world prices implicitly as a function of global tariffs, P = P( T), 
where r = ( r 1 , •.• , r"] .8 Solving ( 4) for P( r) and substituting back into (3) results in goods 
demand equations, C(r), depending only on tariff levels. Further substitution into the utility 
function, equation (1 ), results in an equation U( r) that directly relates each country's utility 
to r, the matrix of tariffs for each good in each country. 
From U(r) the optimal or Nash equilibrium tariffs are derived as the r such that, 
given every other countries tariffs, no country can improve its welfare by altering its tariffs, ri. 
In principle, this equilibrium could be solved for as the ri that solve the first order conditions 
~U;_ = 0 for each country. In an effort to maintain the general nature of the model, and for CJ1i1 
computational reasons, the solution is generated by the use of iterative numerical techniques. 
The procedure begins with good 1 in country 1. A search is conducted for the tariff 
on good 1 that maximizes welfare in country 1 subject to all other tariffs in the world being 
zero. 9 The procedure continues through the remaining tariffs in country 1 and proceeds to 
do the same for the tariffs in the other countries. At the end of this round we have found the 
optimal tariffs for each country in the absence of retaliation. Subsequent rounds determine 
the level of retaliation that is necessary to arrive at the Nash tariff equilibrium. 
The se<:ond round proceeds along the same lines as the first, searching for the optimal 
tariffs. This time, however, the tariffs are conditional on the first round tariffs for all of the 
other countries. This procedure is repeated until no country wishes to alter its tariffs. At this 
point, the Nash tariff equilibrium has been established and welfare calculations can proceed 
as outlined above. 10 It should be noted that it was necessary to impose the constraint that 
taxes/subsidies on exports be zero for the system to have a unique solution. 11 
8 Endowments are constant and hence not included in the argument string. 9 The first round search is conducted in a range from zero to ten; that is, ad valorem tariff rates in the range of zero to 1,000 percent. Subsequent round searches are conducted within an interval of two surrounding the previous round solution. 
10 In only one out of some ten thousand simulations did this procedure fail to converge to the equilibrium. 11 This framework further excludes the analysis of such important elements in CU formation as increasing returns to scale and changes in market structure that accompany the formation of trading blocs. 
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Customs Union Formation 
The next stage of the model involves successive customs umon ( CU) formation. 
First, two of the n countries are selected randomly to form a single trading bloc.12 Once 
these countries have been chosen, the world is characterized as a group of n - 1 trading 
units that are no longer of equal size. Optimal tariffs are calculated for these n - 1 trading 
blocs, as described above, and the resulting level of world welfare is obtained. Welfare is 
still calculated separately for each country within a bloc, maintaining the assumption that 
countries are the same size. 
The optimal tariffs for the customs union are arrived at by treating the two countries 
as a single country with an endowment vector equal to the sum of the member country 
endowments. The vector of common external tariffs is that which maximizes joint welfare. 
The corresponding consumption levels of each of the goods are calculated for the entire bloc 
and distributed across the member countries according to the relative wealth of each country 
valued at the tariff distorted world prices.13 It is possible that one of the countries will be 
made worse off in the CU than it was standing alone. It can be shown, however, that the 
country that gains can compensate the country that loses and still be made better off by the 
agreement. Kemp and Wan (1976) point out that a CU can always be Pareto improving if 
the CU sets the appropriate external tariffs. It follows then that a CU that does not consider 
the welfare of extra-union countries can enhance the welfare of each of its member countries 
and hence that the "winners" can compensate the "losers" when imposing optimal tariffs. 
The process of reducing the number of trading blocs then continues. That is, of the 
n- 1 trading blocs, one of which is a bloc of two countries, two are randomly combined. The 
result will be n- 2 trading units, and either there will be two trading units with two member 
countries and n - 4 single countries, or one trading unit with three member countries and 
n - 3 single countries. This process continues until there are no additional trading blocs to 
be formed, i.e., all countries are included in a single trading bloc. This situation, free trade, 
12 As will be seen, selection rules other than random customs union formation can be used. 
13 The relative wealth of countries will differ in the tariff distorted equilibrium. 
given countries of approximately the same size, will result in the maximum level of world 
welfare. 
A single iteration of the above procedure yields a path of world welfare that is 
dependent on both the pattern of endowments and the order in which countries are chosen 
to form customs unions. In order to eliminate this dependency, the procedure is carried out 
a large number of times. For each iteration, a different distribution of the goods is generated, 
and the pattern of CU formation is different. The results presented will thus be the expected 
path of world welfare, conditional only on the number of countries and the number ofgoods. 
3. Results: Welfare Effects of Customs Union Formation 
Having developed the model theoretically and computationally, it is a straightforward 
matter to modify it to address a number of issues. The questions discussed in this section 
are: (1) what, on average, are the costs or benefits in terms of world welfare of a system 
that reduces trade barriers through CU formation; (2) how much does it matter what type 
of world we live in, e.g., how does the distribution of each good across countries matter; 
(3) does it matter what types of countries form a CU; and (4) how might GATT-imposed 
restrictions on the common external tariff alter the path of world welfare in a system of CU 
formation? 
The re~ults presented in the following subsections are expectations in the statistical 
' 
sense. The process described in Section 2, performed only once, will yield a particular path 
of world welfare dependent on the order in which the countries were randomly selected to 
form customs unions. For instance, the path of world welfare could be very different if the 
random process happened to pick the most similar countries than if it happened to pick 
the most different countries. The following results are thus averages over a large number of 
simulations. The results presented here are based on 200 iterations of the procedure outlined 
above. 
The first subsection will analyze the base case of the effects of customs union forma-
tion. The subsequent subsections will seek to decompose this result and to shed some light 
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on what might cause the actual experience to deviate from this benchmark case. 
General Impact: A Benchmark Case 
This section proceeds to calculate the expected path of world welfare with random 
CU formation. It is difficult to predict what this may look like a priori. While the standard 
gains from trade arguments suggest that the elimination of the barriers to trade between 
countries is likely to be welfare enhancing, the imposition of an optimal common external 
tariff accompanied by retaliation from non-member countries, and the general "beggar-thy-
neighbor" qualities of trading blocs cloud the issue. As discussed above, the results can 
in essence be thought of as the extent to which trade creating forces overshadow the trade 
diversionary tendencies of trading blocs. 
Figure 1 presents the path of world welfare for the benchmark case of bilateralism. 
The vertical axis measures the deviation from free trade welfare of a given configuration 
of trading blocs, 14 •15 and the horizontal axis denotes the number of trading blocs. It is 
presented in a high-low graph of the expected level of welfare at each configuration along 
with the maximum and minimum levels of world welfare at the given configuration. The 
dashed lines are, therefore, the outer envelope of welfare under dynamic customs union 
formation. 16 The solid line in Figure 1 is the expected path of world welfare for a world 
starting with ten countries and three goods that sequentially combine to form CUs until all 
countries are members of a single CU, a situation of free trade. 
From Figure 1, it is evident that a system of liberalization via CU formation is not 
likely to be beneficial should the process stop short of free trade. World welfare is found to 
14 Welfare is measured relative to free trade, which is the situation that maximizes world welfare. 
15 I have refrained from expressing the results as a fraction of free trade world welfare as the appropriate choice 
of parameters can yield any fractional deviation that is desired. This is a drawback to most models of this 
type. Krugman (1991), for example, was able to achieve dramatically different results by varying the elasticity 
of substitution in consumption. 
16 It should be noted that what is depicted is not the same as the optimal path of welfare given a configuration 
of endowments. The resulting low at a given stage may not lie along the same path as the low in the previous 
stage. The minimum and maximum reported are specific to the number of trading blocks rather than to a 
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decline at an increasing rate as the number of trading blocs declines. 17 The minimal level 
of welfare is reached when there are only two large trading blocs, the stage just prior to free 
trade. This is ~ot to say that all CUs are detrimental since what is reported is an average 
across many random simulations. Instead, the decline in welfare is a result of the asymmetric 
changes in welfare caused by the most beneficial and the most detrimental CUs. While the 
welfare increasing arra:cgements lead to a very small increase in welfare, significant losses 
are incurred by the formation of other unions. The result is that on average welfare declines 
with CU formation. 
Interestingly, the lower envelope for world welfare reaches a minimum when there are 
three trading blocs. The computational structure of the model permits a detailed analysis 
17 From left to right on the graph. 
of this phenomenon. The results of such an analysis show that the minimum level of welfare 
arises when the three blocs are configured as one large trade union, composed of eight of the 
original countries, and two of the original countries are excluded from the union. Welfare 
then increases when one of the countries is absorbed into the union. This is quite consistent 
with fears expressed elsewhere that a tremendous drawback to regionalism is its capacity, 
perhaps even tendency, to exclude small, perhaps less developed, countries. 
It is important to note that an increase in world welfare does not necessarily represent 
a pareto improvement. The customs unions that form are always beneficial (with transfers) 
to the member countries, but possibly detrimental to the excluded countries. If world welfare 
increases, it is likely to be because the gains accruing to the CU exceed the losses experienced 
by the excluded blocs, rather than that everybody gains. 
Figure 2 presents the average tariff rates corresponding to the path of world welfare 
in Figure 1. What is depicted is the average tariff paid on any good in any transaction 
involving a positive tariff; thereby including interbloc trade in the calculation. As in Figure 
4, the solid line represents the expected average tariff while the dashed lines represent the 
outer envelope of the average tariffs observed in the 200 iterations. 
Not surprisingly, there is an inverse relationship between average tariff levels and 
world welfare. If the average tariff increases (decreases) with CU formation, world welfare 
decreases (increases). The path of the average tariff rate is quite interesting. The change 
in the number of blocs from ten to two results in roughly a tripling of average tariffs, from 
25% to 75%. These simulated tariff levels are significantly greater than those actually ob- · 
served. There are many possible, not mutually exclusive, explanations for this observation. 
Some examples are: first, there may be greater cooperation between countries, or blocs of 
countries, than this model assumes; second, the relatively small number of countries taken 
as the starting point may be a poor representation of the world;18 and third, goods may be 
closer substitutes than is assumed in this model, so that each country's market power and 
18 Indeed, simulations with a larger number of countries do result in lower optimal tariffs in the initial stages; 
stages with many trading blocs. 
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hence optimal tariffs are lower. It is not unlikely that even in this model the average non-
cooperative tariff would be much lower if the number of countries more accurately reflected 
the world configuration. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from Figures 4 and 5. First, a system of CU formation 
is likely to reduce world welfare until there exist two competing blocs of countries. Second, 
CU formation could lead to significantly higher tariffs than are currently observed. As 
discussed below, controlling this change in tariffs may prove to be the solution to the problem 
posed by the increased tendency towards regionalism. 
The Effects of Specialization 
This section examines the extent to which the degree of specialization affects the 
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is reflected by the variance of the distribution of goods across countries. A greater variance 
in the distribution of goods implies a greater concentration of each good in a small number 
of countries and is conceptually the same as increased specialization in production. Figure 
3 presents the path of world welfare for three different assumptions regarding the degree of 
specialization. The three lines each represent CU formation for different worlds, each with 
goods distributed with a different variance across countries. 
The benchmark case of the previous section is included in Figure 3 as the time-path 
of world welfare for a world in which there is an intermediate degree of specialization. The 
results for this case hold consistently across different assumptions regarding the degree of 
specialization. Also from Figure 3, it is apparent that the loss associated with customs union 
formation is an increasing function of the variance of the distribution of each good across 
countries. This results from the greater disparity in the endowments between the existing 
trading blocs at each stage. For example, suppose that there are only two blocs and the first 
imports goods 1 through m1, while the second imports goods m1 +1 through m. Then, as the 
variance of the distribution of goods increases, so does the fraction of each bloc's endowment 
of its export goods as a fraction of the world endowment. As this percent increases, so does 
each bloc's ability to affect its terms of trade. 19 This implies that each country will impose 
larger tariffs. The larger the tariffs, the larger the deviation from the free trade outcome 
and hence the larger the decline in world welfare associated with the formation of any given 
trading bloc. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from Figure 3 is that the efforts to refocus trade 
negotiations away from bilateral methods to multilateral negotiations should increase with 
beliefs regarding the distribution of resources world-wide; as the variance of the distribution 
increases, so do the detrimental effects of customs union formation. 
Types of CU Formation 
This section concerns itself with the extent to which the relative endowments of 
countries forming CUs matters for world welfare. Riezman (1985) presents a discussion 
of optimal customs union formation where enhancing economic welfare is the objective of 
each individual country. A look at the pattern of existing preferential trading arrangements 
suggests that elements related to· the physical proximity of countries perhaps play a greater 
role than does the enhancement of economic welfare alone. Given this casual observation, 
this section will analyze CU formation along economic lines that will provide insights into 
the effects of bilateralism as it is observed. 
The starting point for this section will be the assertion that proximity is a significant 
indicator of differences in countries. That is, the relative endowments of primary factors and 
the stage of development are highly correlated with proximity. Once this assertion is made, 
it is reasonable to represe:Qt proximity, in this model, with the extent to which individual 
countries differ in their pattern of endowments. 
l9 One way of thinking about this is to make an analogy to the 4-firm concentration ratio. As the concentration of sales within a small number of firms increases, the anticompetitive effects of a merger increase. Similarly, as the good becomes concentrated within a small number of countries, the likelihood that a "merger" of "firms" is more detrimental to world welfare increases. 
The results presented correspond to the pa.th of world welfare under three different 
rules of customs union formation. The first two rules for CU formation are based on a 
comparison of the endowments of the countries; first, countries with the most similar endow-
ments a.re selected to form a. CU a.t ea.ch stage and second, countries with the least similar 
endowments are chosen to form a CU. The third selection mechanism is the benchmark case, 
random CU formation. 
Countries are judged to be similar or different based on the following index of relative 
endowments (RE): 
where 
RE,k = L 18•; - <S'k;l, 
j 
r _ Py · f.xy 
Uxy- "m p ' 
i..J j=l j · f.xj 
is the fraction of the total wealth of country x derived from its endowment of good y. At 
ea.ch stage, the two countries tha.t yield the lowest (highest) RE are determined to be the 
most (least) similar. A country that is endowed with relatively more of a given good is said 
to possess a comparative a.dva.nta.ge with respect to that good. This formula. will thus select 
the two countries with the least and most divergent patterns of comparative a.dva.nta.ge. 
Figure 4 presents the results for the three different scenarios. The graph is to be read 
in the same way as was Figure 1, with the number of independent trading blocs decreasing 
from left to right. The top line in Figure 4 is the pa.th of world welfare assuming that the least 
similar countries form a. CU. 20 The center line represents random customs union formation. 
The bottom line assumes customs union formation between the most similar countries. Ea.ch 
of these scenarios is generated. holding the distribution of goods across countries constant. 
The story told in Figure 4 is that if it is the most different countries that form customs 
unions, customs union formation should be encouraged. In contrast to all other simulations 
thus far, welfare increases in every stage. This result is fairly easily explained in terms of 
20 Note that this differs from the preceding section in that this is for a given distribution of goods across countries 
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trade creation and diversion. When the most different countries eliminate their barriers to 
trade, the potential for trade diversion is greatly reduced. Trade between the "most efficient 
producer," the largest exporter, and the "least efficientproducer," the largest importer, is 
promoted. While it is possible for trade diversion to occur, any deleterious effects that result 
are generally overwhelmed by the positive trade creation effects. 
At the opposite extreme, if the countries with the most similar endowments erect 
common barriers to trade, the effects on world welfare are far worse than random customs 
union formation. This results from the dramatically increased ability of the customs union 
to affect its terms of trade, leading to higher tariffs and increasingly distorted trade flows. 
As blocs with very different endowments appear, these symmetrically higher tariffs divert 
consumption towards that good in which the bloc is well endowed, greatly reducing the 
volume of trade. The reduced volume of trade implies a lower level of world welfare. 
The results of this section imply a possible role for the GATT in a system of hi-
19 . ..._ 
lateral trade arrangements. Tha.t is, if the GATT can devise a. method of encouraging 
arrangements between countries with diverse patterns of comparative a.dva.nta.ge, bilateral 
agreements would be more likely to promote rather than to reduce world welfare. 
21 In ad-
dition, it permits a. superficial analysis of the observed trading arrangements. Given tha.t 
countries seem to enter into such arrangements based on geographical considerations, it 
seems likely tha.t it is similar countries tha.t are entering into these arrangements, with the 
exception of Mexico. The European Economic Community ha.s also ha.d significant difficul-
ties integrating the mediterranean countries, which are less developed, tha.t is, which differ 
significantly from the original members. The results of this section suggest, therefore, tha.t 
the observed arrangements are likely to be welfare reducing. 
Common External Tariff Formulation 
The final issue addressed is the formulation of the common external tariff ( CET) for 
a. given customs union. Article XXIV of the GATT states tha.t "barriers should not on the 
whole be higher or more restrictive than in the constituent territories prior to formation of 
such a. union." While there are many interpretations of this requirement, some involving the 
a.vera.ge of tariffs across goods and some tha.t apply a. common standard to ea.ch good, we 
will focus here on the effects of a. standard applied to ea.ch good separately. 
Suppose tha.t the above guidelines were taken to mean tha.t the CET for a.ny par-
ticular good must not exceed a. trade weighted a.vera.ge of the tariff levels in ea.ch of the 
member countries prior to the agreement. Two issues regarding the imposition of such a. 
requirement are examined below. First, wha.t are the expected benefits of such a. restriction, 
and second, are there other guidelines tha.t might further negate the deleterious effects found 
in the previou.:: sections. As will be discussed below, from a. pragmatic point of view, the 
non-compliance of a. CU with a.ny particular restriction must be considered. 
21 It has been pointed out that this recommendation could be interpreted as suggesting that the most beneficial 
customs unions could be between natural resource poor and natural resource rich countries. The fear was 
subsequently expressed that if this union were between a developed and developing country, this could lead to 
a faster depletion of the developing countries natural resources than is desirable. I would like to point out that 
this recommendation is only suggestive and, as with most rules, there are exceptions to it. 
21 
production in B and C, country A will now import from C. Thus the customs union has 
diverted imports to A away from the most efficient producer and world welfare is reduced. 
Restrictions placed on the external tariff help to reduce the probability that such diversion 
occurs by reducing the likelihood that the common external tariff is greater than the cost 
difference between production in B and C. 
In addition to the reduction in trade diversion associated with higher external tariffs, 
the non-member countries will not be induced to increase their barriers in retaliation. As 
a result, the trade creation resulting from the elimination of the internal barriers to trade 
will likely outweigh the inevitable trade diverting effects and world welfare improves with 
customs union formation. 
The above suggests that GATT restrictions would eliminate the detrimental effects 
of CU formation. Inherent in the GATT, however, is a problem of enforcement. There do 
exist certain "member of the global community" incentives that lead countries to abide by 
the GATT guidelines. But in the event that the GATT guidelines impose large costs on a 
particular country, or group of countries, the GATT guidelines could be ignored. 23 As has 
already been discussed, the cost of wholesale non-compliance with the GATT guidelines is 
potentially severe. Given this, there is interest in examining the potential loss associated with 
relaxing the above restriction. Relaxing the guidelines will, at the margin, induce greater 
compliance with the regulations. Of interest then is the cost, assuming full compliance, of I 
relaxing the rules regarding common external tariff formulation. 
Suppose the GATT were to impose the somewhat looser restriction that the common 
external tariff on imports of a particular good were not to exceed the maximum tariff existing 
in the constituent territories prior to the arrangement. What would be the cost in terms of 
world welfare, assuming both scenarios mean full compliance? From Figure 6, it is evident 
that this would imply a very small reduction in world welfare, and would at the margin 
result in a greater degree of compliance. Figure 6 further reports the path of world welfare 
23 The common external tariffs of the EEC were never evaluated because it was not certain what to do if they 
were found to be unacceptable. 
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Figure 5 presents the pattern of world welfare under two regimes. The top line is the 
path of world welfare when blocs are restricted to imposing a CET no larger than the trade 
weighted average of the member country tariffs prior to the formation of a CU. The bottom 
line is the path of world welfare under random customs union formation and unrestricted 
common external tariff imposition; that is, the benchmark case. 
The benefits of restricting the common external tariff are obvious. Under restricted 
CET formulation, world welfare is not significantly affected by customs union formation, 
while under optimal tariffs, welfare declines significantly. 22 This differential arises through 
the elimination of the trade diverting effects of the increase in monopsony power associated 
with larger countries. Trade diversion may still occur due to the removal of barriers on 
intra-union trade, but is largely eliminated. For example, suppose countries A and C form a 
customs union. If a good was imported into country A from country B prior to the formation 
of the customs union, it must be that B is the more efficient producer of the good. If the 
common external tariff of the [A, C] customs union exceeds the cost differential between 
22 While the sequence of CU formation is random, the sequence is the same in both scenarios. 
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under the stricter guideline that the CET not exceed the minimum of the pre-existing tariffs. 
This is included primarily to illustrate that there is only a marginal payoff to imposing a 
rather severe upper bound on the common external tariff. If one is sufficiently pessimistic 
about the degree of compliance likely to accompany any GATT restriction, the small cost of 
relaxing the restriction and the small benefits associated with a tighter restriction suggest 
that perhaps the former is more prudent than the latter. 
Figure 6 can also be used to loosely discuss the dynamic time-path of world welfare 
under the assumption that regionalism takes the form of free trade areas (FTAs) rather 
than customs unions. FTAs are similar to customs unions with the difference being that 
each country maintains its own set of external tariffs. The·scenarios restricting the common 
external tariffs to their minimum and maximum preexisting values can be thought of as 
upper and lower bounds on the time path of world welfare with FTAs. If the countries 
involved agree not to raise their respective trade barriers, we know that the aggregate rate 
of protection will lie within these bounds. This is quite a striking result. It says that the 
sequential formation of FTAs is, in fact, likely to raise world welfare, or at least not likely to 
lower it. This suggests that free trade areas can indeed serve to complement the multilateral 
process. If, in fact, FTAs do not reduce world welfare even in the absence of progress in 
the multilateral arena, FTAs can be looked upon favorably as they have the potential effect 
of reducing the number of players in any subsequent multilateral negotiations, or at least 
reducing the number of margins on which multilateral negotiations are pushing. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper deals with an issue of increasing importance in a world where preferential 
trading arrangements are the call of the day. The purpose is to provide some insight into 
the potential costs or benefits associated with sequential customs union formation and to 
provide some guidelines against which proposed customs unions might be judged. The 
principle finding of the analysis is that the dynamic time-path of world welfare is likely 
to decline monotonically with sequential customs uni0 -1 formation. This decline stops, of 
course, when the final two trading blocs form a trade union and we have global free trade, 
in which case world welfare is maximized. 
The assertion that free trade is the eventual outcome of bilateralism is, however, not 
certain. More likely is the existence of a small number of large trading blocs. As we have 
seen, this proposition suggests that sequential customs union formation, left unfettered, is 
not likely to be beneficial from a global perspective, and will be particularly detrimental 
should the unions be exclusionary, leaving some countries in the lurch. 
The results presented here are generally consistent with the results presented by 
Krugman. Absent from my results is the somewhat intriguing "pessimal" value of three blocs. 
As mentioned above, the model presented here suggests that welfare declines monotonically 
with a discontinuity between two blocs and a single bloc. The results differ substantially 
from Deardorff and Stern, who suggest that successive customs union formation results in 
monotonically increasing world welfare. As discussed in the introduction, the inclusion of 
only prohibitive tariffs in their analysis is the source of this difference. Where the results 
presented here diverge from the other studies is in the scope of issues the model will address. 
More precisely, this model is capable of analyzing a wider variety of tariff setting rules than 
are either of the other models. In addition, the welfare effects of different patterns of customs 
union formation have been discussed. 
It has been shown that the extent to which PTAs should be thought of as an undesir-
able phenomenon is related very closely to the extent to which countries differ. If one believes 
that resources and technology differ dramatically across countries and that the GATT lacks 
any influence regarding which customs unions are formed, then efforts should be made to 
shift the emphasis of trade negotiations back to the multilateral arena. It would be useful if 
further research on this issue were forthcoming. 
The results further reveal that arrangements between individual countries that differ 
significantly, given a world distribution of goods, should be encouraged while those between 
similar countries should be discouraged. A customs union such as that between the United 
States and Canada, for instance, is more likely to reduce world welfare than is an agreement 
' 
between the U~ted States and Mexico. That is not to say that the U.S.-Canada agreement 
will not enhance the welfare of both countries; in fact, both countries benefit from the for-
mation of a customs union if the appropriate tariffs are set. The reasoning underlying the 
reduction in world welfare is that a U.S.-Canada customs union possesses a greater ability 
to increase its terms of trade than does a U.S.-Mexico arrangement. This is a rather dis-
couraging result. Given the close physical proximity of the countries currently participating 
in preferential trading arrangements the world is likely made worse off by the current set 
of agreements. This conclusion does, however, rest on the assumption that geographical 
proximity is a reasonable proxy for comparative advantage. 
25 
On a more pragmatic level, it has been shown that the guidelines imposed by GATT 
could be extremely effective in reducing the costs associated with customs union formation. 
It has even been shown that these restraints need not be extremely strict to prevent the 
significant losses in terms of world welfare. A restriction as seemingly innocuous as the 
maximum of the pre-existing tariffs will largely eliminate the deleterious effects of customs 
union formation. In addition to the reduction in trade diversion associated with higher 
external tariffs, the non-member countries will not be induced to increase their barriers in 
retaliation. As a result, the trade creation resulting from the elimination of the internal 
barriers to trade will likely outweigh the inevitable trade diverting effects and world welfare 
will improve with customs union formation. 
Whiie this paper has shed light on certain aspects of PTAs, there are a number of 
_:es that have not been addressed. One is the apparent regional aspect of PTAs. This 
suggests that the endogenization of the customs union partner choice should be investigated 
further. In addition, it would be useful to explore different tariff setting rules; tariff setting 
policies that are not intended to reap monopsony benefits, but are instead more consistent 
with perhaps a conservative social welfare approach, or the protection of particular industries 
for non-economic objectives. Some mention was made in the text regarding the likely effects 
of free trade areas. The results presented were merely suggestive. Given the preponderance 
of free trade areas, the differential effects of customs unions and free trade areas should be 
examined in greater detail. 
A final issue is the extent to which gains in the multilateral arena might offset the 
losses due to customs union formation. One way of looking at this issue, in the context of 
this model, is to assume that world tariffs are a declining fraction of the optimal tariffs. For 
instance, the move from ten blocs to nine involves imposing tariffs that are only 95% of the 
optimal level and the move from nine to eight blocs involves the imposition of tariffs that 
are 90% of the optimal level. The declining fraction would be a proxy for success in the 
multilateral arena concurrent with customs union formation. 
Of further interest is the similarity between these results and that of the horizontal 
merger literature. When two countries that export the same product, i.e., the most similar 
countries, form a customs union, the "merger" increases their market power and reduces 
general welfare. A further investigation of this analogy and the incorporation of the insights 
provided by this literature could prove to be informative. 
. '--
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